NETSCOUT.

nGenius 5000 & 7000 Series Packet Flow Switches with PFOS 6.0.6

nGenius 5000 & 7000 Series Packet Flow Switches with PFOS 6.0.6

Security Target

Version 1.7

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Document prepared by



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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

- 1 This Security Target (ST) defines the NETSCOUT nGenius 5000 & 7000 Series Packet Flow Switches with PFOS 6.0.6 Target of Evaluation (TOE) for the purposes of Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.
- 2 The nGenius 5000 series Packet Flow Switch (PFS) provides cost-effective edge aggregation for cybersecurity and service assurance monitoring. The nGenius 5000 series packet flow switch models operate at speeds from 1GbE to 100GbE, providing core packet broker functionality, including filtering, load balancing, aggregation, and replication.

1.2 Identification

Table 1: Evaluation identifiers

Target of Evaluation	nGenius 5000 & 7000 Series Packet Flow Switches with PFOS 6.0.6 Build: 6.0.6.4
Security Target	nGenius 5000 & 7000 Series Packet Flow Switches with PFOS 6.0.6 Security Target, v1.7

1.3 Conformance Claims

3 This ST supports the following conformance claims:

- a) CC version 3.1 revision 5
- b) CC Part 2 extended
- c) CC Part 3 conformant
- d) collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v2.2e
- e) NIAP Technical Decisions per Table 2

Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions

TD #	Name	Rationale if n/a
TD0527	Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1)	
TD0528	NIT Technical Decision for Missing EAs for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4	The TOE does not claim FCS_NTP_EXT.1
TD0536	NIT Technical Decision for Update Verification Inconsistency	
TD0537	NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3	

TD #	Name	Rationale if n/a
TD0538	NIT Technical Decision for Outdated link to allowed-with list	
TD0546	NIT Technical Decision for DTLS - clarification of Application Note 63	The TOE does not claim FCS_DTLS_EXT.1
TD0547	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN	
TD0555	NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference incorrect in TLSS Test	
TD0556	NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 question	
TD0563	NiT Technical Decision for Clarification of audit date information	
TD0564	NiT Technical Decision for Vulnerability Analysis Search Criteria	
TD0569	NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7	FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1 not claimed
TD0570	NiT Technical Decision for Clarification about FIA_AFL.1	
TD0571	NiT Technical Decision for Guidance on how to handle FIA_AFL.1	
TD0572	NiT Technical Decision for Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers	
TD0580	NIT Technical Decision for clarification about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e	
TD0581	NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic curve-based key establishment and NIST SP 800-56Arev3	
TD0591	NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs and hypervisors	TOE is not a virtual TOE
TD0592	NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of Audit Records	
TD0631	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of public key authentication for SSH Server	
TD0632	NIT Technical Decision for Consistency with Time Data for vNDs	TOE is not a vND

TD #	Name	Rationale if n/a
TD0633	NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 not claimed
TD0634	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification required for testing IPv6	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 or FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1 not claimed
TD0635	NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server and Key Agreement Parameters	
TD0636	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key User Authentication for SSH	

1.4 Terminology

Term	Definition
СС	Common Criteria
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
NDcPP	collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
Packet Broker	A device that provides a collection of monitoring tools with access to traffic from across the network.
PP	Protection Profile
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
PFOS	Packet Flow Operating System

Table 3: Terminology

2 **TOE Description**

2.1 Type

4 The TOE is a network device that provides packet broker functionality to enable cybersecurity and service assurance monitoring.

2.2 Usage

5

2.2.1 Deployment

The TOE (depicted within the red dotted lines) is deployed within a network that provides connectivity to the monitored network and monitoring tools as shown in Figure 1.





Figure 1: Example TOE Deployment

2.2.2 Interfaces

6 The TOE management interfaces are shown in Figure 2.



TOE

Figure 2: TOE interfaces

8

- 7 The TOE interfaces are as follows:
 - a) **CLI.** Administrative CLI via direct serial and SSH.
 - b) **GUI.** Administrative web GUI via HTTPS.
 - c) Logs. Logs sent to syslog via SSH.
 - d) **OCSP Responder.** X.509v3 certificate revocation checking via OCSP.

2.3 Security Functions / Logical Scope

The TOE provides the following security functions:

- a) **Protected Communications.** The TOE protects the integrity and confidentiality of communications as noted in section 2.2.2 above.
- b) **Secure Administration.** The TOE enables secure management of its security functions, including:
 - i) Administrator authentication with passwords
 - ii) Configurable password policies
 - iii) Role Based Access Control
 - iv) Access banners
 - v) Management of critical security functions and data
 - vi) Protection of cryptographic keys and passwords
- c) **Trusted Update.** The TOE ensures the authenticity and integrity of software updates through published hash.
- d) **System Monitoring.** The TOE generates logs of security relevant events. The TOE stores logs locally and can send log events to a remote audit server.
- e) **Self-Test.** The TOE performs a suite of self-tests to ensure the correct operation and enforcement of its security functions.
- f) **Cryptographic Operations.** The TOE implements a cryptographic module. Relevant Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: CAVP Certificates

Algorithm Capability	Certificate
AES-CBC, AES-CTR, AES-GCM	C1880
ECDSA KeyGen/KeyVer/SigGen/SigVer (FIPS186-4)	C1881 A1882
CTR AES DRBG	A1002
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512	
KAS-ECC	
SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	

2.4 Physical Scope

9

The physical boundary of the TOE includes all software and hardware shown in Table 5. The TOE is delivered via commercial courier.

Model	CPU	Software	Differences
5010	Intel Atom® Processor C2538	PFOS 6.0.6 Build: 6.0.6.4	Packet capture ports and data rates.
5010-16X	110063301 02330	(Linux kernel version	
5100		4.14.151)	
5110			
7010			
7100			
7110			
5120	Intel® Xeon® Processor D-1518		
7120	110063301 D-1310		

Table 5: TOE models

2.4.1 Guidance Documents

- 10 The TOE includes the following guidance documents (PDF):
 - a) NETSCOUT nGenius 5000 & 7000 Series Packet Flow Switches with PFOS 6.0.6 Common Criteria Guide, v1.1 | June 2022
 - b) NETSCOUT nGenius 5000 & 7000 Series Packet Flow Switches with PFOS 6.0.6 User Guide, 733-1485 | December 2021
 - c) NETSCOUT Packet Flow Operating Software (PFOS) 6.x CLI Reference Guide Software Version 6.0.6, 733-1486 | December 2021

2.4.2 Non-TOE Components

- 11 The TOE operates with the following components in the environment:
 - a) **Audit Server.** The TOE is capable of sending audit events to a Syslog server.
 - b) **OCSP Responder.** X.509v3 certificate revocation checking via OCSP.

2.4.3 Functions not included in the TOE Evaluation

- 12 The logical scope of the TOE comprises the security functions defined in Section 2.3.
- For the TOE to be in the evaluated configuration, the following functions must not be enabled/used:
 - a) None identified.

3 Security Problem Definition

14 The Security Problem Definition is reproduced from section 4 of the NDcPP.

3.1 Threats

Table 6: Threats

Identifier	Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ ADMINISTRATOR_ ACCESS	Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the Network Device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_ CRYPTOGRAPHY	Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_ COMMUNICATION_ CHANNELS	Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use standardized secure tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_ AUTHENTICATION_ ENDPOINTS	Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g. a shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_ COMPROMISE	Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ ACTIVITY	Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the Network Device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and

Identifier	Description		
	the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised.		
T.SECURITY_ FUNCTIONALITY_ COMPROMISE	Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the Network Device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker's credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.		
T.PASSWORD_ CRACKING	Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other Network Devices.		
T.SECURITY_ FUNCTIONALITY_ FAILURE	An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.		

3.2 Assumptions

Table 7: Assumptions

Identifier	Description	
A.PHYSICAL_ PROTECTION	The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the device's physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the physical platform on which the VM runs.	
A.LIMITED_ FUNCTIONALITY	The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its cor function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).	
	In the case of vNDs, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of the distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. There are no other guest VMs on the physical platform providing non-Network Device functionality.	

Identifier	Description		
A.NO_THRU_ TRAFFIC_ PROTECTION	A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).		
A.TRUSTED_ ADMINISTRATOR	The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.		
	For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE's trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).		
A.REGULAR_ UPDATES	The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.		
A.ADMIN_ CREDENTIALS_ SECURE	The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.		
A.RESIDUAL_ INFORMATION	The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.		

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

Table 8: Organizational Security Policies

Identifier	Description
P.ACCESS_BANNER	The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.

4 Security Objectives

15

The security objectives are reproduced from section 5 of the NDcPP.

Table 9: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

Identifier	Description		
OE.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.		
OE.NO_GENERAL_ PURPOSE	There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.		
OE.NO_THRU_ TRAFFIC_ PROTECTION	The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational environment.		
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN	Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this includes the VS Administrator responsible for configuring the VMs that implement ND functionality.		
	For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE's trust store in case such certificate can no longer be trusted.		
OE.UPDATES	The TOE firmware and software is updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.		
OE.ADMIN_ CREDENTIALS_ SECURE	The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.		
OE.RESIDUAL_ INFORMATION	The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.		

5 Security Requirements

5.1 Conventions

16 This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC:

- a) Assignment. Indicated with italicized text.
- b) **Refinement.** Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs.
- c) Selection. Indicated with underlined text.
- d) Assignment within a Selection: Indicated with italicized and underlined text.
- e) **Iteration.** Indicated by adding a string starting with "/" (e.g. "FCS_COP.1/Hash").
- 17 **Note:** Operations performed within the Security Target are denoted within brackets []. Operations shown without brackets are reproduced from the NDcPP.

5.2 Extended Components Definition

18 Refer to Annex A: Extended Components Definition.

5.3 Functional Requirements

Table 10: Summary of SFRs

Requirement	Title	
FAU_GEN.1	Audit Data Generation	
FAU_GEN.2	User Identity Association	
FAU_STG_EXT.1	Protected Audit Event Storage	
FCS_CKM.1	Cryptographic Key Generation	
FCS_CKM.2	Cryptographic Key Establishment	
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic Key Destruction	
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)	
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)	
FCS_COP.1/Hash	Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)	
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)	
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	HTTPS Protocol	
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Random Bit Generation	

Requirement	Title	
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	SSH Client Protocol	
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	SSH Server Protocol	
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	TLS Server Protocol	
FIA_AFL.1	Authentication Failure Management	
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Password Management	
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	User Identification and Authentication	
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	Password-based Authentication Mechanism	
FIA_UAU.7	Protected Authentication Feedback	
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	X.509 Certificate Validation	
FIA_X509_EXT.2	X.509 Certificate Authentication	
FIA_X509_EXT.3	X.509 Certificate Requests	
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Management of Security Functions Behaviour	
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	Management of security functions behaviour	
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	Management of TSF Data	
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	Management of TSF Data	
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions	
FMT_SMR.2	Restrictions on Security Roles	
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)	
FPT_APW_EXT.1	Protection of Administrator Passwords	
FPT_TST_EXT.1	TSF Testing	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Trusted Update	
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Reliable Time Stamps	
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	TSF-initiated Session Locking	
FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated Termination	
FTA_SSL.4	User-initiated Termination	

Requirement	Title
FTA_TAB.1	Default TOE Access Banners
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Trusted Path

5.3.1 Security Audit (FAU)

FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation

- FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
 - a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
 - b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit;
 - c) All administrative actions comprising:
 - Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for Administrators).
 - Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
 - Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
 - Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
 - o [no other actions];
 - d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in **Table 2** Table 11.

Table 11: Audit Events

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1	None.	None.
FAU_GEN.2	None.	None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.1	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.2	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.4	None.	None.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	None.	None.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	Failure to establish a HTTPS Session.	Reason for failure
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session.	Reason for failure.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session.	Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	Failure to establish a TLS Session.	Reason for failure.
FIA_AFL.1	Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Provided user identity, origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7	None.	None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate	Reason for failure
FIA_X509_EXT.2	None.	None.
FIA_X509_EXT.3	None.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Any attempt to initiate a manual update	None.
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	Modification of the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity, the handling of audit data, the	None.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
	audit functionality when Local Audit Storage Space is full.	
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	None.	None.
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	None.	None.
FMT_SMF.1	All management activities of TSF data.	None.
FMT_SMR.2	None.	None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure)	None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time - either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process. (Note that no continuous changes to time need to be logged. See also application note on FPT_STM_EXT.1)	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g., IP address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if "terminate the session" is selected)	The termination of a local session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.4	The termination of an interactive session.	None.
FTA_TAB.1	None.	None.
FTP_ITC.1	Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions.	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.

Requirement		Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	
FTP_TRP.1/Admin		Initiation of the trusted path.	None.	
		Termination of the trusted path.		
		Failure of the trusted path functions.		
FAU_GEN.1.2	The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:			
		e and time of the event, type of evone (success or failure) of the evo		
	the f	each audit event type, based on t unctional components included ir sified in column three of Table 2	n the cPP/ST, information	
FAU_GEN.2	User Id	User Identity Association		
FAU_GEN.2.1	For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.			
FAU_STG_EXT.1	Protect	Protected Audit Event Storage		
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1		The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.		
FAU_STG_EXT.1.2	The TSF addition	TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In ition [
		TOE shall consist of a single star t data locally]	ndalone component that stores	
FAU_STG_EXT.1.3	The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [overwrite oldest record first], [no other action]] when the local storage space for audit data is full.			
5.3.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)				
FCS_CKM.1	Cryptog	graphic Key Generation		
FCS_CKM.1.1		shall generate asymmetric cryperecified cryptographic key generation		
	the f	schemes using "NIST curves" [F ollowing: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digit		

<u>Appendix B.4;</u>]and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

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FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall **perform** cryptographic **key establishment** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key **establishment** method: [

 <u>Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the</u> <u>following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3,</u> <u>"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using</u> <u>Discrete Logarithm Cryptography"</u>

] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].

Application note: Modified by TD0580 and TD0581.

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [

- For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];
- For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [
 - <u>logically addresses the storage location of the key and</u> <u>performs a [single overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];</u>

] that meets the following: No Standard.

FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform *encryption/decryption* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *AES used in* [CBC, CTR, GCM] *mode* and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: *AES as specified in ISO 18033-3,* [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772].

FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform *cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

• <u>Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes</u> [256 bits or greater].

] that meet the following: [

 For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing "NIST curves" [P-256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4]

FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)

FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform *cryptographic hashing services* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384,512] bits that meet the following: *ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004*.

FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHashThe TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic
key sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] and message digest sizes [160, 256,
384, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7
"MAC Algorithm 2".

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol

- FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
- FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS.
- FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3 If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall [not require client authentication] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

- FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
- FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [[*one*] platform-based noise source] with with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 "Security Strength Table for Hash Functions", of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client Protocol

- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol in accordance with: RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [4344, 5656, 6668].
- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [no other method].
- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256 kilo] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com].

- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [ecdsa-sha2-nistp256] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.
- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] as its data integrity MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and [ecdh-sha2nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.
- FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH client authenticates the identity of the SSH server using a local database associating each host name with its corresponding public key and [no other methods] as described in RFC 4251 section 4.1.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with: RFC(s) 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [4344, 5656, 6668].
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password-based].
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256 kilo]bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com].
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [ecdsa-sha2-nistp256] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and [ecdh-sha2nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each

encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol with mutual authentication

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [<u>TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)</u>] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:[

- <u>TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in</u> <u>RFC 4492</u>
- <u>TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in</u> <u>RFC 4492</u>
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- <u>TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined</u> in RFC 5289
- <u>TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined</u> in <u>RFC 5289</u>
- <u>TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined</u> in <u>RFC 5289</u>] and no other ciphersuites.
- FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 and [TLS 1.1].
- FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using [ECDHE curves [secp256r1] and no other curves]].
- FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall support [session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC 5077].

5.3.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

- FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management
- FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1-5] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password.
- FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been <u>met</u>, the TSF shall [prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed].

FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management

FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:

- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [<u>"!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(", ")", [no other</u> <u>characters</u>]];
- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [9] and [15] characters.

FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

- FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:
 - Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
 - [no other actions]
- FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism

FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [password-based] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.

FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback

FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only *obscured feedback* to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress **at the local console**.

FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates.
- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [<u>the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC</u> <u>6960</u>].
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
 - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (idkp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

- Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
- Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
- OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
- FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

- FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [HTTPS], and [no additional uses].
- FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [accept the certificate].

FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests

- FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request Message as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and [Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country].
- FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response.

5.3.4 Security Management (FMT)

FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour

- FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to <u>enable</u> the functions <u>to</u> <u>perform manual updates to Security Administrators.</u>
- FMT_MOF.1/Functions Management of security functions behaviour
- FMT_MOF.1.1/FunctionsThe TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the
functions [transmission of audit data to an external IT entity] to
Security Administrators.

FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data

- FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to <u>manage</u> the <u>TSF data to</u> <u>Security Administrators</u>.
- FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys	The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic
	keys to Security Administrators.

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [hash <u>comparison</u>] capability prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
- [
- o Ability to configure audit behaviour;
- <u>Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;</u>
- o Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
- <u>Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate</u> <u>X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;</u>
- <u>Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;</u>
- o <u>Ability to manage the trusted public keys database;</u>
- <u>No other capabilities]</u>
- FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
- FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
 - Security Administrator.
- FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
- FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
 - The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
 - The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely

are satisfied.

5.3.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)

FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords

- FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.
- FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.

FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing

- FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on), periodically during normal operations] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [
 - Image integrity tests
 - Configuration integrity tests
 - Cryptographic module integrity
 - Hardware integrity].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted update

- FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide [*Administrators*] the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [the most recently installed version of the TOE firmware/software;].
- FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide [*Administrators*] the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].
- FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [published hash] prior to installing those updates.

FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps

- FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
- FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].

FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking

- FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [
 - terminate the session]

after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination

FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate **a remote** interactive session after a *Security* Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.

FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination

FTA_SSL.4.1 Refinement: The TSF shall allow **Administrator**-initiated termination of the **Administrator's** own interactive session.

FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners

FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.

5.3.6 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

- FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall **be capable of using [SSH] to provide** a trusted communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [no other** <u>capabilities]</u> that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.
- FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit **the TSF or the authorized IT entities** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
- FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [*audit* server].

FTP_TRP.1 /Admin Trusted Path

FTP_TRP.1.1/AdminThe TSF shall be capable of using [SSH, HTTPS] to provide a
communication path between itself and authorized remote
Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of
modification of the channel data.

FTP_TRP.1.2 /Admin The TSF shall permit <u>remote **Administrators**</u> to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3 /Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial <u>Administrator</u> <u>authentication and all remote administration actions</u>.

5.4 Assurance Requirements

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The TOE security assurance requirements are summarized in Table 12.

Table 12: Assurance Requirements

Assurance Class	Components	Description	
Security Target	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance Claims	
Evaluation	ASE_ECD.1	Extended Components Definition	
	ASE_INT.1	ST Introduction	
	ASE_OBJ.1	Security Objectives for the operational environment	
	ASE_REQ.1	Stated Security Requirements	
	ASE_SPD.1	Security Problem Definition	
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE Summary Specification	
Development	ADV_FSP.1	Basic Functional Specification	
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE.1	Operational User Guidance	
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative User Guidance	
Life Cycle Support	ALC_CMC.1	Labelling of the TOE	
	ALC_CMS.1	TOE CM Coverage	
Tests	ATE_IND.1	Independent Testing - conformance	
Vulnerability Assessment	AVA_VAN.1	Vulnerability Analysis	

20

In accordance with section 7.1 of the NDcPP, the following refinement is made to ASE:

a) ASE_TSS.1.1C Refinement: The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR. In the case of entropy analysis, the TSS is used in conjunction with required supplementary information on Entropy.

6 **TOE Summary Specification**

The following describes how the TOE fulfils each SFR included in section 5.3.

6.1 Security Audit

6.1.1 FAU_GEN.1

- The TOE generates the audit records specified at FAU_GEN.1 containing fields that include the timestamp, IP address (if applicable), action, user (if applicable) and a contextual message indicating success or failure of the action.
- 23 The following information is logged as a result of the Security Administrator generating/importing or deleting cryptographic keys:
 - a) Generate SSH key-pair. Action and key reference.
 - b) **Generate cryptographic keys**. Action and key reference.
 - c) Import Certificate. Action and key reference.
 - d) Import CA Certificate. Action and key reference.

6.1.2 FAU_GEN.2

The TOE includes the user identity in audit events resulting from actions of identified users.

6.1.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1

- The Security Administrator can configure the TOE to send logs to a Syslog server. Log events are sent in real-time. Logs are sent via SSH as described by FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.
- The amount of audit data that may be stored locally is dependent on the available disk space, which is 4GB.
- 27 When the local audit data store is full, the TOE will overwrite audit records starting with the oldest audit record.
- 28 Only authorized administrators may view audit records and no capability to modify the audit records is provided.

6.2 Cryptographic Support

6.2.1 FCS_CKM.1

- a) The TOE supports key generation for the following asymmetric schemes:
 - i) ECC P-256/P-384/P-521. Used in SSH and TLS.

6.2.2 FCS_CKM.2

- 29 The TOE supports the following key establishment schemes:
 - a) **ECC schemes.** Used in SSH and TLS ciphersuites with ECDH key exchange. TOE is both sender and receiver.
- 30 Table 13 below identifies the scheme being used by each service.

Scheme	SFR	Service
ECC	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Administration
	FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	Syslog Server
	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	HTTPS/TLS

Table 13: Key Agreement Mapping

6.2.3 FCS_CKM.4

Keys held in volatile memory are zeroized after use by overwriting the key storage area with zeroes. Keys held in flash memory may be destroyed using a Command Line Interface (CLI) command to overwrite the entire flash memory an administrator specified number of times (between 1 and 10) with zeroes. This command is used when a device is reset or taken out of operation and is further described in the Common Criteria Guide. Table 15 shows the origin, storage location and destruction details for cryptographic keys and passwords. Unless otherwise stated, the keys are generated by the TOE.

6.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption

- The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using 128- and 256-bit AES in CBC, CTR and GCM mode. AES is implemented in the following protocols: TLS and SSH.
- 33 The relevant NIST CAVP certificate numbers are listed Table 4.

6.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen

- 34 The TOE provides cryptographic signature generation and verification services using:
 - a) ECDSA Signature Algorithm with key sizes 256 bits, 384 bits, and 512 bits with NIST curves P-256, P-384, P-521, respectively.
- 35 These ECDSA signature verification services are used in the TLS protocols.
- 36 The relevant NIST CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 4.

6.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash

- The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
- 38 SHA is implemented in the following parts of the TSF:
 - a) TLS and SSH;
 - b) Published hash verification as part of trusted update validation; and
 - c) Hashing of passwords in non-volatile storage.
- 39 The relevant NIST CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 4.

6.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash

40 The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512.

41 HMAC is implemented in the following protocols: TLS and SSH.

42

The characteristics of the HMACs used in the TOE are given in Table 14. Table 14: HMAC Characteristics

Algorithm	Block Size	Key Size	Digest Size
HMAC-SHA-1	512 bits	160 bits	160 bits
HMAC-SHA-256	512 bits	256 bits	256 bits
HMAC-SHA-384	1024 bits	384 bits	384 bits
HMAC-SHA-512	1024 bits	512 bits	512 bits

43 The relevant NIST CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 4.

6.2.8 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1

- 44 The TOE web GUI is accessed via an HTTPS connection using the TLS implementation described by FCS_TLSS_EXT.1. The TOE does not use HTTPS in a client capacity. The TOE's HTTPS protocol complies with RFC 2818.
- 45 RFC 2818 specifies HTTP over TLS. The majority of RFC 2818 is spent on discussing practices for validating endpoint identities and how connections must be setup and torn down. The TOE web GUI operates on an explicit port designed to natively speak TLS: it does not attempt STARTTLS or similar multi-protocol negotiation which is described in section 2.3 of RFC 2818. The web server uses a variant of OpenSSL which attempts to send closure Alerts prior to closing a connection in accordance with section 2.2.2 of RFC 2818.

6.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1

- 46 The TOE contains a CTR_DRBG that is seeded from the hardware entropy source. Entropy from the noise is conditioned and used to seed the DRBG with 256 bits of full entropy.
- 47 Additional detail is provided the proprietary Entropy Description.

6.2.10 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1

- 48 The TOE implements SSH in compliance with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4344, 5656, 6668.
- 49 The TOE supports public key authentication (ecdsa-sha2-nistp256). In the case of public keys, the TOE authenticates to the SSH server using a local private key, associated with a remote database of authorized public keys on the SSH server.
- 50 The TOE examines the size of each received SSH packet. If the packet is greater than 256 KB, it is automatically dropped.
- 51 The TOE utilised ECDSA-SHA2-NISTP256, for its public key algorithm when using public key authentication.
- 52 The TOE utilises AES-CTR-128, AES-CTR-256, AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256 for SSH encryption.
- 53 The TOE provides data integrity for SSH connections via HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-256 and HMAC-SHA2-512.

- 54 The TOE supports ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384 and ecdh-sha2nistp521 for SSH key exchanges.
- 55 The TOE will re-key SSH connections after 1 hour of after an aggregate of 1 gig of data has been exchanged (whichever occurs first).
- 56 The TOE ensures the identity of the SSH server using a local database of known hosts, associating each host name with its corresponding public key.

6.2.11 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1

- 57 The TOE implements SSH in compliance with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4344, 5656, 6668.
- 58 The TOE supports password-based or public key authentication (ecdsa-sha2nistp256). In the case of public keys, the TOE authenticates the identity of the SSH client using a local database associating authorized hosts with its corresponding public key.
- 59 The TOE examines the size of each received SSH packet. If the packet is greater than 256 KB, it is automatically dropped.
- 60 The TOE utilised ECDSA-SHA2-NISTP256 for its public key algorithm when using public key authentication.
- 61 The TOE utilises AES-CTR-128, AES-CTR-256, AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256 for SSH encryption.
- 62 The TOE provides data integrity for SSH connections via HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-256 and HMAC-SHA2-512.
- 63 The TOE supports ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384 and ecdh-sha2nistp521 for SSH key exchanges.
- 64 The TOE will re-key SSH connections after 1 hour of after an aggregate of 1 gig of data has been exchanged (whichever occurs first).

6.2.12 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1

- 65 The TOE operates as a TLS server for the web GUI trusted path.
- 66 The server only allows TLS protocol versions 1.2 (rejecting any other protocol version, including SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and any other unknown TLS version string supplied) and is restricted to the following ciphersuites by default:
 - a) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
 - b) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
 - c) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
 - d) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
 - e) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
 - f) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289

Ciphersuites are not user configurable.

67 The TLS server can negotiate ciphersuites that include ECDHE key agreement schemes.

68 The TOE supports session resumption based on session tickets. The TOE supports session tickets according to RFC5077

6.3 Identification and Authentication

6.3.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1

- The TOE supports the local definition of users with corresponding passwords. The passwords can be composed of any combination of upper- and lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "%", "\", "&", "*", "(", ")".
- The minimum password length is settable by the Administrator and can range from 9 to 15 characters.

6.3.2 FIA_UIA_EXT.1

- The TOE requires all users to be successfully identified and authenticated. The TOE warning banner and TOE version may be viewed prior to authentication.
- Administrative access to the TOE is facilitated through one of several interfaces:
 - a) Directly connecting to the TOE appliance
 - b) Remotely connecting to each appliance via SSH
 - c) Remotely connecting to appliance GUI via HTTPS

6.3.3 FIA_UAU_EXT.2

- Regardless of the interface at which the administrator interacts, the TOE prompts the user for a credential. Only after the administrative user presents the correct authentication credentials will they be granted access to the TOE administrative functionality. No TOE administrative access is permitted until an administrator is successfully identified and authenticated.
- 74 The TOE provides a local password-based authentication mechanism.
- The process for authentication is the same for administrative access whether administration is occurring via direct connection or remotely. At initial login, the administrative user is prompted to provide a username. After the user provides the username, the user is prompted to provide the administrative credential associated with the user account (e.g., password or SSH public/private key response). The TOE then either grants administrative access (if the combination of username and credential is correct) or indicates that the login was unsuccessful. The TOE does not provide a reason for failure in the cases of a login failure.

6.3.4 FIA_UAU.7

For all authentication at the local CLI the TOE provides obscured feedback when the administrative password is entered so that the password is obscured.

6.3.5 FIA_AFL.1

- 77 The TOE is capable of tracking authentication failures of remote administrators.
- 78 When a user account has sequentially failed authentication the configured number of times (default 5), the account will be locked for a Security Administrator defined time period (default 1 hour).
- 79 The administrator can configure the maximum number of failed attempts using the web GUI or CLI.

80 The local console does not implement the lockout mechanism.

6.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev / FIA_X509_EXT.2 / FIA_X509_EXT.3

- The TOE performs certificate validity checking for the TLS connection between the TOE and the administrative workstation. As part of the certificate validation checking, the TSF will validate certificate revocation status using an OCSP server in the Operational Environment. If the revocation status cannot be verified, the certificate is accepted.
- The TSF determines the validity of certificates by ensuring that the certificate and the certificate path are valid in accordance with RFC 5280. The TOE supports a minimum path length of three certificates for audit server certificates. While the TOE supports a minimum path length of 2 certificates for TOE certificates. In addition, the certificate path is terminated in a trusted CA certificate, the basicConstraints extension is present, and the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates. Finally, the TOE ensures the extendedKeyUsage field includes the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) for server certificates used in TLS, the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) for OCSP certificates used for OCSP.
- In order to support HTTPS/TLS connectivity for the web UI interface, the TSF of all components provide the ability to generate a Certificate Request Message as specified by RFC 2986 so that its server certificate can be signed by a Certification Authority. The message includes public key, Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, and Country values. The certificate chain of the Certificate Response is validated by the TSF prior to being installed as the TOE's server certificate.
- 84 Revocation checking occurs at regular intervals on certificates within the trust store. The checking is for both "Certificate" and "Certificate Authority" certificates. Revocation checking uses OCSP and occurs once every hour.
- ⁸⁵ If the certificate chain is incomplete, then it becomes invalidated. Revocation is performed only if a full valid chain is found.
- 86 Certificate validity checking takes place only on upload to the File Management page. Validity checking is done only for the TOE's own certificate and no others.

6.4 Security Management

6.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate

87 The TOE restricts the ability to perform software updates to Security Administrators.

6.4.2 FMT_MOF.1/Functions

The TOE restricts the ability to modify (enable/disable) transmission of audit records to an external audit server to Security Administrators.

6.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData

89 Users are required to login before being provided with access to any administrative functions. The TOE restricts the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.

6.4.4 **FMT_SMR.2**

- ⁹⁰ The TOE implements role-based access control based on pre-defined profiles that are assigned when creating a user.
- 91 The TOE supports the following roles:
 - a) Security Administrator
- 92 Management of TSF data via the CLI or web GUI is restricted to Security Administrators.

6.4.5 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys

93 The TOE restricts generation, importation, or deletion of all cryptographic keys. to Security Administrators.

6.4.6 **FMT_SMF.1**

The TOE may be managed via the CLI (console & SSH) or GUI (HTTPS). The specific management capabilities include:

- a) Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely
- b) Ability to configure the access banner
- c) Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking
- d) Ability to update the TOE and to verify the updates
- e) Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters
- f) Ability to configure audit behavior (enable/disable remote logging)
- g) Ability to set the time which is used for timestamps
- h) Ability to manage the cryptographic keys, including import and management of X.509v3 certificates
- i) Ability to manage the trusted public keys database.

6.5 Protection of the TSF

6.5.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1

⁹⁵ Keys are protected as described in Table 15. In all cases, plaintext keys cannot be viewed through an interface designed specifically for that purpose.

Table 15: Keys

Кеу	Algorithm	Storage	Zeroization
TLS Private Key	ECDSA (P- 256, P-384, P- 521)	Flash - plaintext	Overwritten with zeroes by erase-disk command.
TLS Public Key	ECDSA (P- 256, P-384, P- 521)	Flash - plaintext	n/a – public key

Кеу	Algorithm	Storage	Zeroization
SSH Public Key	ECDSA (P- 256, P-384, P- 521)	Flash - plaintext	Overwritten with zeroes by erase-disk command.
SSH Private Key	ECDSA (P- 256, P-384, P- 521)	Flash - plaintext	Overwritten with zeroes by erase-disk command.
AES key used for TLS	AES-128 AES-256	RAM - plaintext	Overwritten with zeroes upon termination of the session or reboot of the appliance
AES key used for SSH	AES-128 AES-256	RAM - plaintext	Overwritten with zeroes upon termination of the session or reboot of the appliance
EC Diffie- Hellman Keys	ECDHE	Plaintext in RAM	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.

6.5.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1

96

Passwords are protected as describe in Table 16. In all cases plaintext passwords cannot be viewed through an interface designed specifically for that purpose.

Table 16: Passwords

Key/Password	Generation/ Algorithm	Storage	Zeroization
Locally stored administrator passwords	User generated	Flash - SHA- 256 hash	Overwritten with zeroes by erase-disk command.

6.5.3 FPT_TST_EXT.1

97 At startup, the TOE undergoes the following tests:

- a) POST or power on self-test: The POST memory test writes various data patterns into memory locations and reads them back to confirm that each memory location is functional. The test then interacts with every device in the machine looking for any failures. If any tests fail, the POST writes the failure indicator to the display and exits. When the POST ends successfully, the BIOS searches the various boot mechanisms (using the boot ordering maintained in ROM) for the operating system.
- b) FIPS Self-Test. During startup, the TOE performs cryptographic verification tests consisting of the following:
 - i) software integrity test: HMAC-SHA1 verification of the binary code comprising the module executable
 - ii) KATs (known answer tests) for cryptographic algorithms
 - iii) PCTs (pairwise consistency tests) for asymmetric key pairs: a conditional test that runs only when asymmetric keys are generated

iv) random bit and random number generator tests: (conditional tests that run only when random bits and random numbers are generated.

6.5.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.1

- 98 The current firmware version may be queried using either the CLI or the Web GUI.
- ⁹⁹ The administrator may download a firmware update from the trusted source and verify it using the published hash. Namely, an administrator must download the update along with the SHA256 checksum associated with the file from the NETSCOUT support website to their local machine.
- 100 Only administrators may initiate updates to the TOE. The administrator should discard unsuccessfully validated images, otherwise the update should be applied to the TOE.

6.5.5 FPT_STM_EXT.1

- 101 The TOE incorporates an internal clock that is used to maintain date and time. The Security Administrator sets the date and time during initial TOE configuration and may change the time during operation.
- 102 The TOE makes used of time for the following:
 - a) Audit record timestamps
 - b) Session timeouts (lockout enforcement)
 - c) Certificate validation

6.6 TOE Access

6.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1

103 The Security Administrator may configure the TOE to terminate an inactive local interactive session (CLI) following a specified period. The timeout value is set to thirty minutes by default.

6.6.2 FTA_SSL.3

104 The Security Administrator may configure the TOE to terminate an inactive remote interactive session (CLI and Web UI) following a specified period. The timeout value is set to thirty minutes by default.

6.6.3 FTA_SSL.4

Administrative users may terminate their own sessions by logging out.

6.6.4 FTA_TAB.1

106 The TOE displays an administrator configurable message to users prior to login at the local CLI, the remote CLI, and web GUI.

6.7 Trusted Path/Channels

6.7.1 FTP_ITC.1

- 107 The TOE supports secure communication with the following IT entities:
 - a) Audit server per FCS_SSHC_EXT.1

6.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Admin

108 The TOE provides the following trusted paths for remote administration:

- a) Web GUI over HTTPS per FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1
- b) CLI over SSH per FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1

109

7 Rationale

7.1 Conformance Claim Rationale

The following rationale is presented with regard to the PP conformance claims:

- a) **TOE type.** As identified in section 2.1, the TOE is network device, consistent with the NDcPP.
- b) **Security problem definition.** As shown in section 12, the threats, OSPs and assumptions are reproduced directly from the NDcPP.
- c) **Security objectives.** As shown in section 4, the security objectives are reproduced directly from the NDcPP.
- d) **Security requirements.** As shown in section 5, the security requirements are reproduced directly from the NDcPP. No additional requirements have been specified.

7.2 Security Objectives Rationale

All security objectives are drawn directly from the NDcPP.

7.3 Security Requirements Rationale

All security requirements are drawn directly from the NDcPP. Table 17 presents a mapping between threats and SFRs as presented in the NDcPP.

Table 17	NDcPP SFR	Rationale
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Identifier	SFR Rationale
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINIS TRATOR_ACCESS	• The Administrator role is defined in FMT_SMR.2 and the relevant administration capabilities are defined in FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_MTD.1/CoreData, with optional additional capabilities in FMT_MOF.1/Services and FMT_MOF.1/Functions
	 The actions allowed before authentication of an Administrator are constrained by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, and include the advisory notice and consent warning message displayed according to FTA_TAB.1
	 The requirement for the Administrator authentication process is described in FIA_UAU_EXT.2
	 Locking of Administrator sessions is ensured by FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (for local sessions), FTA_SSL.3 (for remote sessions), and FTA_SSL.4 (for all interactive sessions)
	 The secure channel used for remote Administrator connections is specified in FTP_TRP.1/Admin
	• (Malicious actions carried out from an Administrator session are separately addressed by T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY)

Identifier	SFR Rationale
	(Protection of the Administrator credentials is separately addressed by T.PASSWORD_CRACKING).
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY	 Requirements for key generation and key distribution are set in FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.2 respectively Requirements for use of cryptographic schemes are set in FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption, FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/Hash, and FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Requirements for random bit generation to support key generation and secure protocols (see SFRs resulting from T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS) are set in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Management of cryptographic functions is specified in FMT_SMF.1
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNI CATION_CHANNELS	• The general use of secure protocols for identified communication channels is described at the top level in FTP_ITC.1 and FTP_TRP.1/Admin; for distributed TOEs the requirements for inter-component communications are addressed by the requirements in FPT_ITT.1
	 Requirements for the use of secure communication protocols are set for all the allowed protocols in FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1, FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2, FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1, FCS_DTLSS_EXT.2, FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
	 Optional and selection-based requirements for use of public key certificates to support secure protocols are defined in FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FIA_X509_EXT.3
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATIO N_ENDPOINTS	• The use of appropriate secure protocols to provide authentication of endpoints (as in the SFRs addressing T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS) are ensured by the requirements in FTP_ITC.1 and FTP_TRP.1/Admin; for distributed TOEs the authentication requirements for endpoints in inter-component communications are addressed by the requirements in FPT_ITT.1
	Additional possible special cases of secure authentication during registration of distributed TOE components are addressed by FCO_CPC_EXT.1 and FTP_TRP.1/Join.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE	 Requirements for protection of updates are set in FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Additional optional use of certificate-based protection of
	 Additional optional use of certificate-based protection of signatures can be specified using FPT_TUD_EXT.2, supported by the X.509 certificate processing requirements in FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2 and FIA_X509_EXT.3

Identifier	SFR Rationale
	• Requirements for management of updates are defined in FMT_SMF.1 and (for manual updates) in FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate, with optional requirements for automatic updates in FMT_MOF.1/AutoUpdate
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY	 Requirements for basic auditing capabilities are specified in FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2, with timestamps provided according to FPT_STM_EXT.1 and if applicable, protection of NTP channels in FCS_NTP_EXT.1
	 Requirements for protecting audit records stored on the TOE are specified in FAU_STG.1
	 Requirements for secure transmission of local audit records to an external IT entity via a secure channel are specified in FAU_STG_EXT.1
	 Optional additional requirements for dealing with potential loss of locally stored audit records are specified in FAU_STG_EXT.2/LocSpace, and FAU_STG_EXT.3/LocSpace
	• If (optionally) configuration of the audit functionality is provided by the TOE then this is specified in FMT_SMF.1, and confining this functionality to Security Administrators is required by FMT_MOF.1/Functions.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONAL ITY_COMPROMISE	 Protection of secret/private keys against compromise is specified in FPT_SKP_EXT.1
	Secure destruction of keys is specified in FCS_CKM.4
	 If (optionally) management of keys is provided by the TOE then this is specified in FMT_SMF.1, and confining this functionality to Security Administrators is required by FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys
	 (Protection of passwords is separately covered under T.PASSWORD_CRACKING)
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING	 Requirements for password lengths and available characters are set in FIA_PMG_EXT.1
	 Protection of password entry by providing only obscured feedback is specified in FIA_UAU.7
	 Actions on reaching a threshold number of consecutive password failures are specified in FIA_AFL.1
	 Requirements for secure storage of passwords are set in FPT_APW_EXT.1.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONAL ITY_FAILURE	 Requirements for running self-test(s) are defined in FPT_TST_EXT.1
P.ACCESS_BANNER	 An advisory notice and consent warning message is required to be displayed by FTA_TAB.1

Annex A: Extended Components Definition

See appended PDF extract of NDcPP extended components definition.

C. Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for the extended requirements that are used in the cPP, including those used in Appendices A and B.

(Note: formatting conventions for selections and assignments in this Appendix are those in [CC2].)

C.1 Security Audit (FAU)

C.1.1 Security Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN_EXT)

Family Behaviour

This component defines the requirements for components in a distributed TOE to generate security audit data.

1

Component levelling

FAU_GEN_EXT Security Audit Data Generation

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{FAU}}\xspace_{\mathsf{GEN}}\xspace_{\mathsf{EXT}.1}$ Security audit data shall be generated by all components in a distributed TOE

Management: FAU_GEN_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) The TSF shall have the ability to configure the cryptographic functionality.

Audit: FAU_GEN_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) No audit necessary.

C.1.1.1 FAU_ GEN_EXT.1 Security Audit Data Generation for Distributed TOE Components

FAU_GEN_EXT.1	Security Audit Data Generation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	None.

FAU_GEN_EXT.1.1. The TSF shall be able to generate audit records for each TOE component. The audit records generated by the TSF of each TOE component shall include the subset of security relevant audit events which can occur on the TOE component.

C.1.2 Protected Audit Event Storage (FAU_STG_EXT)

Family Behaviour

This component defines the requirements for the TSF to be able to securely transmit audit data between the TOE and an external IT entity.

Component levelling



FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected audit event storage requires the TSF to use a trusted channel implementing a secure protocol.

FAU_STG_EXT.2 Counting lost audit data requires the TSF to provide information about audit records affected when the audit log becomes full.

FAU_STG_EXT.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss requires the TSF to generate a warning before the audit trail exceeds the local storage capacity.

FAU_STG_EXT.4 Protected Local audit event storage for distributed TOEs requires the TSF to use a trusted channel to protect audit transfer to another TOE component.

FAU_STG_EXT.5 Protected Remote audit event storage for distributed TOEs requires the TSF to use a trusted channel to protect audit transfer to another TOE component.

Management: FAU_STG_EXT.1, FAU_STG_EXT.2, FAU_STG_EXT.3, FAU_STG_EXT.4, FAU_STG_EXT.5

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) The TSF shall have the ability to configure the cryptographic functionality.

Audit: FAU_STG_EXT.1, FAU_STG_EXT.2, FAU_STG_EXT.3, FAU_STG_EXT.4. FAU_STG_EXT.5

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) No audit necessary.

C.1.2.1 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage

FAU_STG_EXT.1	Protected Audit Event Storage
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1

FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition [selection:

- The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally,
- The TOE shall be a distributed TOE that stores audit data on the following TOE components: [assignment: identification of TOE components],
- The TOE shall be a distributed TOE with storage of audit data provided externally for the following TOE components: [assignment: list of TOE components that do not store audit data locally and the other TOE components to which they transmit their generated audit data].

FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [selection: *drop new audit data, overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [assignment: rule for overwriting previous audit records], [assignment: other action]*] when the local storage space for audit data is full.

C.1.2.2 FAU_STG_EXT.2 Counting Lost Audit Data

FAU_STG_EXT.2	Counting Lost Audit Data

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
	FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage

FAU_STG_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide information about the number of [selection: *dropped, overwritten, [assignment: other information]*] audit records in the case where the local storage has been filled and the TSF takes one of the actions defined in FAU_STG_EXT.1.3.

C.1.2.3 FAU_STG_EXT.3 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss

FAU_STG_EXT.3	Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage

FAU_STG_EXT.3.1/LocSpace The TSF shall generate a warning to inform the Administrator before the audit trail exceeds the local audit trail storage capacity.

C.1.2.4 FAU_ STG_EXT.4 Protected Local Audit Event Storage for Distributed TOEs

FAU_STG_EXT.4	Protected Audit Event Storage
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN_EXT.1 Security Audit data generation for Distributed TOE Components [FPT_ITT.1 Intra-TSF Trusted Channel or FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel]

FAU_STG_EXT.4.1 The TSF of each TOE component which stores security audit data locally shall perform the following actions when the local storage space for audit data is full: [assignment: table of components and for each component its action chosen according to the following: [selection: drop new audit data, overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [assignment: rule for overwriting previous audit records], [assignment: other action]]].

C.1.2.5 FAU_ STG_EXT.5 Protected Remote Audit Event Storage for Distributed TOEs

FAU_STG_EXT.5	Protected Audit Event Storage
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FAU_GEN_EXT.1 Security Audit data generation for Distributed TOE Components [FPT_ITT.1 Intra-TSF Trusted Channel or FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel]

FAU_STG_EXT.5.1 Each TOE component which does not store security audit data locally shall be able to buffer security audit data locally until it has been transferred to another TOE component that stores or forwards it. All transfer of audit records between TOE components shall use a protected channel according to [selection: *FPT_ITT.1*, *FTP_ITC.1*].

C.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

C.2.1 Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT)

C.2.1.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for random bit/number generation. This is a new family defined for the FCS class.

Component levelling

FCS_RBG_EXT RandomBit Generation 1

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.

Management: FCS_RBG_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) There are no management activities foreseen

Audit: FCS_RBG_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) Minimal: failure of the randomization process

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [selection: *Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)*].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source, [assignment: number of platform-based sources] platform-based noise source] with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least

equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 "Security Strength Table for Hash Functions", of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

C.2.2 Cryptographic Protocols (FCS_DTLSC_EXT, FCS_DTLSS_EXT, FCS_HTTPS_EXT, FCS_IPSEC_EXT, FCS_NTP_EXT, FCS_SSHC_EXT, FCS_SSHS_EXT, FCS_TLSC_EXT, FCS_TLSS_EXT)

C.2.2.1 FCS_DTLSC_EXT DTLS Client Protocol

Family Behaviour

The component in this family addresses the ability for a client to use DTLS to protect data between the client and a server using the DTLS protocol.

Component levelling



FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1 DTLS Client requires that the client side of DTLS be implemented as specified.

FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2 DTLS Client requires that the client side of the DTLS implementation include mutual authentication.

Management: FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1, FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1, FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of DTLS session establishment
- b) DTLS session establishment
- c) DTLS session termination

FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1	DTLS Client Protocol	
Hierarchical to:	No other components	

Dependencies:	FCS_CKM. 1DataEncryption1 Cryptographic Key Generation
	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen1SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [selection: *DTLS 1.2 (RFC 6347), DTLS 1.0 (RFC 4347)*] supporting the following ciphersuites:

• [assignment: List of optional ciphersuites and reference to RFC in which each is defined].

FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [selection: the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6, IPv4 address in CN or SAN, IPv6 address in the CN or SAN, IPv4 address in SAN, IPv6 address in the SAN, the identifier per RFC 5280 Appendix A using [selection: id-at-commonName, id-at-countryName, id-at-dnQualifier, id-at-generationQualifier, id-at-givenName, id-at-initials, id-at-localityName, id-at-name, id-at-organizationalUnitName, id-at-organizationName, id-at-pseudonym, id-at-serialNumber, id-at-stateOrProvinceName, id-at-surname, id-at-title] and no other attribute types].

FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.3 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [selection:

- Not implement any administrator override mechanism
- require administrator authorization to establish the connection if the TSF fails to [selection: match the reference identifier, validate certificate path, validate expiration date, determine the revocation status] of the presented server certificate
-].

FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall [selection: not present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension, present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with the following curves/groups: [selection: secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192] and no other curves/groups] in the Client Hello.

FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2	DTLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FCS_CKM.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1 DTLS Client Protocol
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.

FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2.2 The TSF shall [selection: *terminate the DTLS session, silently discard the record*] if a message received contains an invalid MAC.

FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2.3 The TSF shall detect and silently discard replayed messages for:

- DTLS records previously received;
- DTLS records too old to fit in the sliding window.

C.2.2.2 FCS_DTLSS_EXT DTLS Server Protocol

Family Behaviour

The component in this family addresses the ability for a server to use DTLS to protect data between a client and the server using the DTLS protocol.

Component levelling



FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1 DTLS Server requires that the server side of TLS be implemented as specified.

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.2: DTLS Server requires that mutual authentication be included in the DTLS implementation.

Management: FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1, FCS_DTLSS_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1, FCS_DTLSS_EXT.2

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of DTLS session establishment.
- b) DTLS session establishment
- c) DTLS session termination

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1 DTLS Server Protocol

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment FCS_COP.1//DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption) FCS_COP.1//SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification) FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation FIA X509 EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
	FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [selection: *DTLS 1.2 (RFC 6347), DTLS 1.0 (RFC 4347)*] supporting the following ciphersuites:

• [assignment: List of optional ciphersuites and reference to RFC in which each is defined]

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting [assignment: list of protocol versions].

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall not proceed with a connection handshake attempt if the DTLS Client fails validation.

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using [selection: RSA with key size [selection: 2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits], Diffie-Hellman parameters with size [selection: 2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits, 6144 bits, 8192 bits], Diffie-Hellman groups [selection: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, no other groups], ECDHE curves [selection: secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other curves].

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall [selection: *terminate the DTLS session, silently discard the record*] if a message received contains an invalid MAC.

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall detect and silently discard replayed messages for:

- DTLS records previously received.
- DTLS Records too old to fit in the sliding window.

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall support [selection: no session resumption or session tickets, session resumption based on session IDs according to RFC 4346 (TLS1.1) or RFC 5246 (TLS1.2), session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC 5077].

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.2 DTLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption) FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification) FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) FCS RBG EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
	FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1 DTLS Server Protocol

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall support mutual authentication of DTLS clients using X.509v3 certificates.

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.2.2 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the client certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [selection:

- Not implement any administrator override mechanism
- require administrator authorization to establish the connection if the TSF fails to [selection: match the reference identifier, validate certificate path, validate expiration date, determine the revocation status] of the presented client certificate

].

FCS_DTLSS_EXT.2.3 The TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the distinguished name (DN) or Subject Alternative Name (SAN) contained in a certificate does not match the expected identifier for the client.

C.2.2.3FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol

Family Behaviour

Components in this family define the requirements for protecting remote management sessions between the TOE and a Security Administrator. This family describes how HTTPS will be implemented. This is a new family defined for the FCS Class.

Component levelling

FCS_HTTPS_EXT HTTPS Protocol

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS requires that HTTPS be implemented according to RFC 2818 and supports TLS.

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Management: FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	HTTPS Protocol
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	[FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol, or FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol]

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol using TLS.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3 If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall [selection: *not establish the connection, request authorization to establish the connection, [assignment: other action]*] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

C.2.2.4 FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for protecting communications using IPsec.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT IPsec Protocol 1

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec requires that IPsec be implemented as specified.

Management: FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) Maintenance of SA lifetime configuration

Audit: FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Decisions to DISCARD, BYPASS, PROTECT network packets processed by the TOE.
- b) Failure to establish an IPsec SA
- c) IPsec SA establishment
- d) IPsec SA termination
- e) Negotiation "down" from an IKEv2 to IKEv1 exchange.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) Communications
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
	FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
	FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES
	Data encryption/decryption)
	FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature
	Generation and Verification)
	FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is otherwise unmatched and discards it.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall implement [selection: *tunnel mode, transport mode*].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the cryptographic algorithms [selection: *AES-CBC-128 (RFC 3602), AES-CBC-192 (RFC 3602), AES-CBC-256 (RFC 3602), AES-GCM-128 (RFC 4106), AES-GCM-192 (RFC 4106), AES-GCM-256 (RFC 4106),*] together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC [selection: *HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, no HMAC algorithm*].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [selection:

- *IKEv1, using Main Mode for Phase 1 exchanges, as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [selection: no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers, RFC 4304 for extended sequence numbers], and [selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions];*
- IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996 [selection: with no support for NAT traversal, with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in RFC 5996, section 2.23)], and [selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [selection: *IKEv1*, *IKEv2*] protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms [selection: *AES-CBC-128*, *AES_CBC-192*, *AES-CBC-256* (specified in RFC 3602), *AES-GCM-128*, *AES-GCM-192*, *AES-GCM-256* (specified in RFC 5282)].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [selection:

- *IKEv1 Phase 1 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on* [selection:
 - number of bytes;
 - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [assignment: integer range including 24] hours;

];

- *IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on* [selection:
 - o number of bytes;
 - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [assignment: integer range including 24] hours

]

].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [selection:

- *IKEv1 Phase 2 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on* [selection:
 - number of bytes;
 - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [assignment: integer range including 8] hours;

];

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- *IKEv2 Child SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on* [selection:
 - o number of bytes;
 - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [assignment: integer range including 8] hours;

].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman key exchange ("x" in $g^x \mod p$) using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and having a length of at least [assignment: (one or more) number(s) of bits that is at least twice the security strength of the negotiated Diffie-Hellman group] bits.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall generate nonces used in [selection: *IKEv1*, *IKEv2*] exchanges of length [selection:

- according to the security strength associated with the negotiated Diffie-Hellman group;
- at least 128 bits in size and at least half the output size of the negotiated pseudorandom function (PRF) hash
].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TSF shall ensure that IKE protocols implement DH Group(s) [selection:

- [selection: 14 (2048-bit MODP), 15 (3072-bit MODP), 16 (4096-bit MODP), 17 (6144-bit MODP), 18 (8192-bit MODP)] according to RFC 3526,
- [selection: 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP), 21 (521-bit Random ECP), 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS)] according to RFC 5114.

].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TSF shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [selection: *IKEv1 Phase 1, IKEv2 IKE_SA*] connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [selection: *IKEv1 Phase 2, IKEv2 CHILD_SA*] connection.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer authentication using [selection: *RSA*, *ECDSA*] that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and [selection: *Pre-shared Keys, no other method*].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The TSF shall only establish a trusted channel if the presented identifier in the received certificate matches the configured reference identifier, where the presented and reference identifiers are of the following fields and types: [selection: *SAN: IP address, SAN: Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), SAN: user FQDN, CN: IP address, CN:*

Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), CN: user FQDN, Distinguished Name (DN)] and [selection: no other reference identifier type, [assignment: other supported reference identifier types]].

C.2.2.5 FCS_NTP_EXT.1 NTP Protocol

Family Behaviour

The component in this family addresses the ability for a TOE to protect NTP time synchronization traffic.

Component levelling

FCS_NTP_EXT NTP Protocol

FCS_NTP_EXT.1 Requires NTP to be implemented as specified

Management: FCS_NTP_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) Ability to configure NTP

Audit: FCS_NTP_EXT.1

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) No audit requirements are specified.

FCS_NTP_EXT.1	NTP Protocol
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation [FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1 DTLSC Client Protocol or FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol]

FCS_NTP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall use only the following NTP version(s) [selection: *NTP v3* (*RFC 1305*), *NTP v4* (*RFC 5905*)].

FCS_NTP_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall update its system time using [selection:

• Authentication using [selection: <u>SHA1, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, AES-CBC-128,</u> <u>AES-CBC-256]</u> as the message digest algorithm(s); • [selection: <u>*IPsec, DTLS*</u>] to provide trusted communication between itself and an NTP time source.

FCS_NTP_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall not update NTP timestamp from broadcast and/or multicast addresses.

FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall support configuration of at least three (3) NTP time sources in the Operational Environment.

C.2.2.6 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client

Family Behaviour

1.

The component in this family addresses the ability for a client to use SSH to protect data between the client and a server using the SSH protocol.

Component levelling



FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client requires that the client side of SSH be implemented as specified.

Management: FCS_SSHC_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_SSHC_EXT.1

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of SSH session establishment
- b) SSH session establishment
- c) SSH session termination

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client Protocol Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1Cryptographic Key Generation

 Dependencies:
 FCS_CKM.1Cryptographic Key Generation

 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption

 Copendencies:

 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption

 Copendencies:

 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption

 Copendencies:

 FCS_COP.1/SigGen

 Cryptographic

 Operation

 FCS_COP.1/SigGen

 Cryptographic

 Operation

 (Signature

 Generation

 Addition

FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) FCS_PRC_EXT_1_Rendem Bit Constraints

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol in accordance with: RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [selection: 4256, 4344, 5647, 5656, 6187, 6668, 8268, 8308 section 3.1, 8332].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [selection: *password-based, no other method*].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [assignment: number of bytes] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [assignment: *list of encryption algorithms*].

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [selection: *ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, x509v3-ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, x509v3-rsa2048-sha256] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms*

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [assignment: list of data integrity MAC algorithms] as its data integrity MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [assignment: list of key exchange methods] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH client authenticates the identity of the SSH server using a local database associating each host name with its corresponding public key and [selection: *a list of trusted certification authorities, no other methods*] as described in RFC 4251 section 4.1.

C.2.2.7 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

Family Behaviour

The component in this family addresses the ability for a server to offer SSH to protect data between a client and the server using the SSH protocol.



FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server requires that the server side of SSH be implemented as specified.

Management: FCS_SSHS_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_SSHS_EXT.1

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of SSH session establishment
- b) SSH session establishment
- c) SSH session termination

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FCS_CKM.1Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES
	Data encryption/decryption) FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash
	Algorithm) FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol in accordance with: RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [selection: *4256*, *4344*, *5647*, *5656*, *6187*, *6668*, *8268*, *8308* section 3.1, 8332].

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [selection: *password-based, no other method*].

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [assignment: number of bytes] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: *[assignment: encryption algorithms]*.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [selection: *ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, x509v3-ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, x509v3-rsa2048-sha256] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.*

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [assignment: list of MAC algorithms] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [assignment: list of key exchange methods] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

C.2.2.8 FCS_TLSC_EXT TLS Client Protocol

Family Behaviour

The component in this family addresses the ability for a client to use TLS to protect data between the client and a server using the TLS protocol.

Component levelling



FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client requires that the client side of TLS be implemented as specified.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client requires that the client side of the TLS implementation include mutual authentication.

Management: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of TLS session establishment
- b) TLS session establishment
- c) TLS session termination

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol without Mutual Authentication

No other components
 FCS_CKM. 1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption) FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification) FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation FIA X509 EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [selection: *TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)*] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

• [assignment: list of optional ciphersuites and reference to RFC in which each is defined] and no other ciphersuites.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [selection: the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6, IPv4 address in CN or SAN, IPv6 address in the CN or SAN, IPv4 address in SAN, IPv6 address in the SAN, the identifier per RFC 5280 Appendix A using [selection: id-at-commonName, id-at-countryName, id-at-dnQualifier, id-at-generationQualifier, id-at-givenName, id-at-initials, id-at-localityName, id-at-name, id-at-organizationalUnitName, id-at-organizationName, id-at-pseudonym, id-at-serialNumber, id-at-stateOrProvinceName, id-at-surname, id-at-title] and no other attribute types].

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [selection:

- Not implement any administrator override mechanism
- require administrator authorization to establish the connection if the TSF fails to [selection: match the reference identifier, validate certificate path, validate expiration date, determine the revocation status] of the presented server certificate

].

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall [selection: not present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension, present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with the following curves/groups: [selection: secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192] and no other curves/groups] in the Client Hello.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	 FCS_CKM.1Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption) FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification) FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol without mutual authentication FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall support TLS communication with mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.

C.2.2.9 FCS_TLSS_EXT TLS Server Protocol

Family Behaviour

The component in this family addresses the ability for a server to use TLS to protect data between a client and the server using the TLS protocol.

Component levelling



FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server requires that the server side of TLS be implemented as specified.

FCS_TLSS_EXT.2: TLS Server requires the mutual authentication be included in the TLS implementation.

Management: FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSS_EXT.2

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Failure of TLS session establishment
- b) TLS session establishment
- c) TLS session termination

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol without Mutual Authentication

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption) FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification) FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [selection: *TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)*] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

• [assignment: list of optional ciphersuites and reference to RFC in which each is *defined*] and no other ciphersuites.

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 and [selection: *TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2, none*].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using [selection: RSA with key size [selection: 2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits], Diffie-Hellman parameters with size [selection: 2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits, 6144 bits, 8192 bits], Diffie-Hellman groups

[selection: *ffdhe2048*, *ffdhe3072*, *ffdhe4096*, *ffdhe6144*, *ffdhe8192*, *no other groups*], *ECDHE curves* [selection: *secp256r1*, *secp384r1*, *secp521r1*] and no other curves]].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall support [selection: *no session resumption or session tickets, session resumption based on session IDs according to* RFC 4346 (*TLS1.1*) *or* RFC 5246 (*TLS1.2*), *session resumption based on session tickets according to* RFC 5077].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication

Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data encryption/decryption) FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification) FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol without mutual authentication FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall support TLS communication with mutual authentication of TLS clients using X.509v3 certificates.

FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.2 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the client certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [selection:

- Not implement any administrator override mechanism
- require administrator authorization to establish the connection if the TSF fails to [selection: match the reference identifier, validate certificate path, validate expiration date, determine the revocation status] of the presented client certificate

].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.3 The TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the identifier contained in a certificate does not match an expected identifier for the client. If the identifier is a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), then the TSF shall match the identifiers according to RFC 6125, otherwise the TSF shall parse the identifier from the certificate and match the identifier against the expected identifier of the client as described in the TSS.

C.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

C.3.1 Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT)

Family Behaviour

The TOE defines the attributes of passwords used by administrative users to ensure that strong passwords and passphrases can be chosen and maintained.

Component levelling

FIA_PMG_EXT Password Management 1

FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password management requires the TSF to support passwords with varying composition requirements, minimum lengths, maximum lifetime, and similarity constraints.

Management: FIA_PMG_EXT.1

No management functions.

Audit: FIA_PMG_EXT.1

No specific audit requirements.

C.3.1.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management

FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Password Management	
Hierarchical to:	No other components.	
Dependencies:	No other components.	

FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:

- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [selection: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "&", "(", ")", [assignment: other characters]];
- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [assignment: minimum number of characters supported by the TOE] and [assignment: number of characters greater than or equal to 15] characters.

C.3.2 User Identification and Authentication (FIA_UIA_EXT)

Family Behaviour

The TSF allows certain specified actions before the non-TOE entity goes through the identification and authentication process.

FIA_UIA_EXT User Identification and Authentication		1
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FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication requires Administrators (including remote Administrators) to be identified and authenticated by the TOE, providing assurance for that end of the communication path. It also ensures that every user is identified and authenticated before the TOE performs any mediated functions

Management: FIA_UIA_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) Ability to configure the list of TOE services available before an entity is identified and authenticated

Audit: FIA_UIA_EXT.N

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) All use of the identification and authentication mechanism
- b) Provided user identity, origin of the attempt (e.g. IP address)

C.3.2.1 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

FIA_UIA_EXT.1	User Identification and Authentication
Hierarchical to:	No other components.

Dependencies: FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
- [selection: no other actions, automated generation of cryptographic keys, [assignment: list of services, actions performed by the TSF in response to non-TOE requests]].

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

C.3.3 User authentication (FIA_UAU_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Provides for a locally based administrative user authentication mechanism

FIA_UAU_EXT Password-based Authentication Mechanism 2

FIA_UAU_EXT.2 The password-based authentication mechanism provides administrative users a locally based authentication mechanism.

Management: FIA_UAU_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) None

Audit: FIA_UAU_EXT.2

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) Minimal: All use of the authentication mechanism

C.3.3.1 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism

FIA_UAU_EXT.2	Password-based Authentication Mechanism
Hierarchical to:	No other components.

Dependencies: No other components.

FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [selection: *password-based*, *SSH public key-based*, *certificate-based*, [assignment: other authentication mechanism(s)]] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.

C.3.4 Authentication using X.509 certificates (FIA_X509_EXT)

Family Behaviour

This family defines the behaviour, management, and use of X.509 certificates for functions to be performed by the TSF. Components in this family require validation of certificates according to a specified set of rules, use of certificates for authentication for protocols and integrity verification, and the generation of certificate requests.



FIA_X509_EXT.1 X509 Certificate Validation, requires the TSF to check and validate certificates in accordance with the RFCs and rules specified in the component.

FIA_X509_EXT.2 X509 Certificate Authentication, requires the TSF to use certificates to authenticate peers in protocols that support certificates, as well as for integrity verification and potentially other functions that require certificates.

FIA_X509_EXT.3 X509 Certificate Requests, requires the TSF to be able to generate Certificate Request Messages and validate responses.

Management: FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FIA_X509_EXT.3

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Remove imported X.509v3 certificates
- b) Approve import and removal of X.509v3 certificates
- c) Initiate certificate requests

Audit: FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FIA_X509_EXT.3

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) Minimal: No specific audit requirements are specified.

C.3.4.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.1	X.509 Certificate Validation	

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation.
- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.

- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [selection: the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3, Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5, no revocation method]
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules: [assignment: rules that govern contents of the extendedKeyUsage field that need to be verified].

FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

C.3.4.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X509 Certificate Authentication

FIA_X509_EXT.2	X.509 Certificate Authentication
Hierarchical to:	No other components

Dependencies: FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [selection: *DTLS, HTTPS, IPsec, TLS, SSH, [assignment: other protocols], no protocols], and [selection: code signing for system software updates [assignment: other uses], no additional uses].*

FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [selection: *allow the Administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases, accept the certificate, not accept the certificate*].

C.3.4.3FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests

FIA_X509_EXT.3	X.509 Certificate Requests
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and [selection: *device-specific information, Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country, [assignment: other information]*].

FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response.

C.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

C.4.1 Protection of TSF Data (FPT_SKP_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for managing and protecting TSF data, such as cryptographic keys. This is a new family modelled after the FPT_PTD Class.

Component levelling

FPT_SKP_EXT Protection of TSF Data 1

FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading all symmetric keys), requires preventing symmetric keys from being read by any user or subject. It is the only component of this family.

Management: FPT_SKP_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FPT_SKP_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) There are no auditable events foreseen.

C.4.1.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)

FPT_SKP_EXT.1Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No other components.

FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

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C.4.2 Protection of Administrator Passwords (FPT_APW_EXT)

C.4.2.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords

Family Behaviour

Components in this family ensure that the TSF will protect plaintext credential data such as passwords from unauthorized disclosure.

Component levelling

FPT_APW_EXT Protection of Administrator Passwords

FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator passwords requires that the TSF prevent plaintext credential data from being read by any user or subject.

Management: FPT_APW_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) No management functions.

Audit: FPT_APW_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) No audit necessary.

FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components.

FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.


FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.

C.4.3 TSF Self-Test (FPT_TST_EXT)

C.4.3.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for self-testing the TSF for selected correct operation.



FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Self-Test requires a suite of self-tests to be run during initial start-up in order to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF.

Management: FPT_TST_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) No management functions.

Audit: FPT_TST_EXT.1

The following actions should be considered for audit if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Indication that TSF self-test was completed
- b) Failure of self-test

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Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No other components.

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [selection: *during initial start-up* (*on power on*), *periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions* [assignment: conditions under which self-tests should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [assignment: list of self-tests run by the TSF].

C.4.4 Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for updating the TOE firmware and/or software.

Component levelling



FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update requires management tools be provided to update the TOE firmware and software, including the ability to verify the updates prior to installation.

FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted update based on certificates applies when using certificates as part of trusted update and requires that the update does not install if a certificate is invalid.

Management: FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Ability to update the TOE and to verify the updates
- b) Ability to update the TOE and to verify the updates using the digital signature capability (FCS_COP.1/SigGen) and [selection: *no other functions, [assignment: other cryptographic functions (or other functions) used to support the update capability]*]
- c) Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [selection: *digital signature, published hash, no other mechanism*] capability prior to installing those updates

Audit: FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.2

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Initiation of the update process.
- b) Any failure to verify the integrity of the update

C.4.4.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update

FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Trusted Update
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (for Cryptographic Signature and Verification), or FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (for cryptographic hashing)

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: *Administrators*] the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [selection: *the most recently installed version of the TOE firmware/software; no other TOE firmware/software version*].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide [assignment: *Administrators*] the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [selection: *support automatic checking for updates, support automatic updates, no other update mechanism*].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [selection: *X.509 certificate, digital signature, published hash*] prior to installing those updates.

C.4.4.2 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update Based on Certificates

FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Trusted Update Based on Certificates
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Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FPT_TUD_EXT.1

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall check the validity of the code signing certificate before installing each update.

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 If revocation information is not available for a certificate in the trust chain that is not a trusted certificate designated as a trust anchor, the TSF shall [selection: *not install the update, allow the Administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases*].

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3 If the certificate is deemed invalid because the certificate has expired, the TSF shall [selection: *allow the Administrator to choose whether to install the update in these cases, not accept the certificate*].

FPT_TUD_EXT.2.4 If the certificate is deemed invalid for reasons other than expiration or revocation information being unavailable, the TSF shall not install the update.

C.4.5 Time stamps (FPT_STM_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family extend FPT_STM requirements by describing the source of time used in timestamps.

Component levelling

FPT_STM_EXT Time Stamps 1

FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps is hierarchic to FPT_STM.1: it requires that the TSF provide reliable time stamps for TSF and identifies the source of the time used in those timestamps.

Management: FPT_STM_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Management of the time
- b) Administrator setting of the time.

Audit: FTA_SSL_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) Discontinuous changes to the time.

C.4.5.1FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps

FPT_STM_EXT.1	Reliable Time Stamps	
Hierarchical to:	No other components	
Dependencies:	No other components.	

FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [selection: *allow the Security Administrator to set the time, synchronise time with an NTP server*].

C.5 TOE Access (FTA)

C.5.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking (FTA_SSL_EXT)

Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for TSF-initiated and user-initiated locking, unlocking, and termination of interactive sessions.

The extended FTA_SSL_EXT family is based on the FTA_SSL family.

Component levelling

FTA_SSL_EXTTSF-initiated session locking 1

FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated session locking, requires system initiated locking of an interactive session after a specified period of inactivity. It is the only component of this family.

Management: FTA_SSL_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

c) Specification of the time of user inactivity after which lock-out occurs for an individual user.

Audit: FTA_SSL_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

b) Any attempts at unlocking an interactive session.

C.5.1.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking

FTA_SSL_EXT.1	TSF-initiated Session Locking

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [selection:

- lock the session disable any activity of the Administrator's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session, and requiring that the Administrator re-authenticate to the TSF prior to unlocking the session;
- *terminate the session*]

after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

C.6 Communication (FCO)

C.6.1 Communication Partner Control (FCO_CPC_EXT)

Family Behaviour

This family is used to define high-level constraints on the ways that partner IT entities communicate. For example, there may be constraints on when communication channels can be used, how they are established, and links to SFRs expressing lower-level security properties of the channels.

Component levelling

FCO_CPC_EXT Communication Partner Control

FCO_CPC_EXT.1 Component Registration Channel Definition, requires the TSF to support a registration channel for joining together components of a distributed TOE, and to ensure that the availability of this channel is under the control of an Administrator. It also requires statement of the type of channel used (allowing specification of further lower-level security requirements by reference to other SFRs).

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Management: FCO_CPC_EXT.1

No separate management functions are required. Note that elements of the SFR already specify certain constraints on communication in order to ensure that the process of forming a distributed TOE is a controlled activity.

Audit: FCO_CPC_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FCO_CPC_EXT.1 is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Enabling communications between a pair of components as in FCO_CPC_EXT.1.1 (including identities of the endpoints).
- b) Disabling communications between a pair of components as in FCO_CPC_EXT.1.3 (including identity of the endpoint that is disabled).

If the required types of channel in FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2 are specified by using other SFRs then the use of the registration channel may be sufficiently covered by the audit requirements on those SFRs: otherwise a separate audit requirement to audit the use of the channel should be identified for FCO_CPC_EXT.1.

C.6.1.1FCO_CPC_EXT.1 Component Registration Channel Definition

FCO_CPC_EXT.1 Component Registration Channel Definition

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No other components.

FCO_CPC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall require a Security Administrator to enable communications between any pair of TOE components before such communication can take place.

FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement a registration process in which components establish and use a communications channel that uses [assignment: *list of different types of channel given in the form of a selection*] for at least [assignment: *type of data for which the channel must be used*].

FCO_CPC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall enable a Security Administrator to disable communications between any pair of TOE components.